Cohen v. Brown: I am Woman, Hear Me Score by Cheesebrough, Ted Riley
Volume 5 Issue 2 Article 4 
1998 
Cohen v. Brown: I am Woman, Hear Me Score 
Ted Riley Cheesebrough 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ted R. Cheesebrough, Cohen v. Brown: I am Woman, Hear Me Score, 5 Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports L.J. 295 
(1998). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol5/iss2/4 
This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal by an authorized 
editor of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
Casenotes
COHEN v. BROWN: I AM WOMAN, HEAR ME SCORE
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972 (Title IX) to protect individuals from gender-based discrimi-
nation in colleges and high schools that receive federal financial
assistance.' As the federal law prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of sex in education programs, including athletics programs,
Title IX provides the principal mechanism for asserting the rights
of women in hopes of obtaining equal opportunities in college and
high school athletics.2 Though Title IX has prompted enormous
growth in women's athletics since its inception, widespread discrim-
ination still exists.3 Collegiate female athletes continue to lack the
same opportunities that their male counterparts enjoy. This is
partly due to the financial strain that the high-priced world of col-
lege athletics places on institutional attempts to comply with Title
IX. 4
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994).
2. See Deborah Brake & Elizabeth Caitlin, The Path of Most Resistance: The Long
Road Toward Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 DuKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y 51,
52 (1996) (noting vital role Title IX has played in opening competitive sports to
female athletes over last quarter century); see alsojanetJudge et al., Gender Equity in
the 1990's: An Athletic Administrator's Survival Guide to Title IX and Gender Equity Com-
pliance, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 313, 314-15 (1995) (suggesting that Title IX,
formerly considered idealistic and ineffective, has recently flourished and acted as
catalyst for universities to review and rearrange their athletic departments in order
to comply with Title IX); cf. Charles Spitz, Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics as
Mandated by Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972: Fair or Foul?, 21 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 621, 648-49 (1997) (discussing composition of 1996 U.S. Olympic
team (42.9% women), having highest female percentage in American history).
3. SeeJill K. Johnson, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: Current Judicial Interpre-
tation of the Standards for Compliance, 74 B.U. L. REv. 553, 554 (1994);Julie Crawford
& John L. Strope, Gender Equity in College Athletics: How Far Have We Really Come In
Twenty Years?, 104 EDUC. L. REP. 553, 553-54 (1995) (suggesting that while there
have been efforts to create equal opportunities for women in sports, equality has
not been achieved); Joseph P. Williams, Lower Pay for Women's Coaches: Recruiting
Some Common Justifications, 21 J.C. & U.L. 643, 645 (1995) (noting continuing dis-
parities between women's and men's athletic programs despite significant efforts
to increase female participation in athletics); Renee Forseth et al., Progress in Gen-
der Equity? An Overview of the History and Future of Title IX of the Education Amendments
Act of 1972, 2 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.F. 51, 51 (1995) (claiming that gender discrim-
ination remains prevalent in college athletics despite presence of Title IX).
4. See R. Lindsay Marshall, Cohen v. Brown University: The First Circuit Breaks
New Ground Regarding Title 1X's Application to Intercollegiate Athletics, 28 GA. L. REv.
(295)
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Legal challenges brought by athletes against colleges and uni-
versities have moved the most formidable battles off of the playing
fields, rinks and courts and into a different type of court. In the
past five years, several federal court decisions have changed the
look of college athletics. 5 Most recently, in Cohen v. Brown University
(Cohen V),6 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit provided fe-
male athletes with another victory, and saddled sports administra-
tions with a debilitating defeat. 7
Part II of this Note discusses the legislative and jurisprudential
history leading up to Cohen V 8 Part III introduces the parties and
facts of the case. 9 Part IV sets forth the majority and dissenting
opinions of Cohen IV 1 Part V analyzes these opinions, including
the court's interpretation and application of Title IX. 11 Finally,
part VI discusses the import and repercussions likely to flow from
the decision in Cohen JV.12
II. BACKGROUND
A. Legislative Framework
Congress enacted Title IX of the Education Amendments of
197213 to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex in education
programs, including athletic programs, by any school receiving fed-
eral financial assistance.14 Due to the statute's broad language and
limited legislative history,15 academic institutions were left with few
837, 838 (1994) (discussing economic difficulties facing athletic departments with
respect to Title IX).
5. See, e.g., Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding
that dropping men's swimming and diving squad is not violation of Title IX); Rob-
erts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993) (deciding that
cutting women's fast-pitch softball team violates Title IX even though men's base-
ball team was also cut); Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993)
(finding that elimination of women's field hockey and gymnastics teams violates
Title IX).
6. 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (Cohen IM).
7. Id.
8. See infra notes 13-64 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 65-78 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 79-139 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 140-173 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 174-185 and accompanying text.
13. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994).
14. See id. § 1681 (a). Section 1681 (a) provides, "[n]o Person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... " Id.
15. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 893 (1st Cir. 1993) (Cohen II)
(noting that Congress included no committee report with final bill and there were
[Vol. 5: p. 295
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guidelines to determine how Title IX affected them, especially as it
applied to their athletic programs. 16 Congress attempted to resolve
this uncertainty by passing the Javits Amendment. 17 The Javits
Amendment directed the Secretary of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW) to promulgate regulations for inter-
collegiate athletics.18 In 1975, the HEW prepared these regula-
tions.19 However, the regulations failed to clarify how athletic
programs could comply with Title IX.20
Finally, in 1979, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) issued a Pol-
icy Interpretation of Title IX.21 The purpose of the Policy Interpre-
tation was to assist colleges and universities in understanding and
complying with the duties imposed by Title IX.22 The OCR's Policy
Interpretation enumerates three areas requiring specific compli-
ance: athletic financial assistance (scholarships), benefits and op-
portunities (equipment, supplies, practice times) and effective
accommodation of student interests and opportunities.23 As to the
latter area, universities can demonstrate effective accommodation
of student interests and opportunities by meeting at least one of
three criteria: (1) showing that the number of intercollegiate ath-
only two mentions of intercollegiate athletics during congressional debate); 118
Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972) (stating Senator Bayh's comment concerning privacy in
sports facilities); 117 Cong. Rec. 30,407 (1971) (reporting Sen. Bayh's view that
proposed Title IX shall not require desegregation of intercollegiate football
squads).
16. See Darryl C. Wilson, Parity Bowl IX: Barrier Breakers v. Common Sense Makers
? The Serpentine Struggle for Gender Diversity in Collegiate Athletics, 27 CUMB. L. REv.
397, 415-416 (1997) ("The original Title IX did not specifically reference athletic
programs and was very general.. . ."); Susan M. Shook, The Title IX Tug-of-War and
Intercollegiate Athletics in the 1990's: Nonrevenue Men's Teams Join Women Athletes in the
Scramble for Survival, 71 IND. L.J. 773, 775 (1996); see also Judge, supra note 2, at 315
(remarking that, despite Title IX's straightforward appearance, compliance is not
easily measured).
17. Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 484,612 (1974).
18. See id. The amendment mandates the HEW to issue regulations enforcing
Title IX relating to educational institutions, including, "with respect to intercolle-
giate athletic activities, reasonable provisions considering the nature of the particu-
lar sports." Id.
19. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.37(c), 106.41(a)-(c) (1995) (declaring that Title IX
applies to intercollegiate athletics).
20. See Wilson, supra note 16, at 417; see also Walter B. Connolly, Jr. & Jeffrey
D. Adelman, A University's Defense to a Title IX Gender Equity in Athletics Lawsuit: Con-
gress Never Intended Gender Equity Based on Student Body Ratios, 71 U. DET. MERCY L.
REv. 845, 851 (1994); Marshall, supra note 4, at 844; Spitz, supra note 2, at 629.
21. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c).
22. See id. In addition to setting forth a framework to resolve complaints, the
Policy Interpretation provides schools with additional guidance on how to comply
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letic opportunities for student-athletes is "substantially proportion-
ate" to the respective enrollments of men and women; 24 (2)
showing that the institution has a history and continuing practice of
expanding programs for the underrepresented sex;25 or (3) show-
ing that the existing athletic programs fully and effectively accom-
modate the interests and abilities of the underrepresented
gender. 26
B. Judicial Decisions
Lack of compliance with the three-prong test of effective ac-
commodation by colleges and universities has been the locus of nu-
merous judicial decisions. 27 Prior to 1988, there were fewjudicial
declarations scrutinizing Title IX claims brought by intercollegiate
athletes. 28 This was attributable to the Supreme Court's decision in
Grove City College v. Bell 29 In Grove City, the Court adopted a "pro-
gram-specific" approach to examining Title IX claims, holding that
Title IX applies only to the specific programs within an educational
institution that receive federal financial aid and are found to be
discriminatory. 30 Because federal monies received by universities
24. See id. at 71,418. No strict ratio has been established to determine what
can be considered "substantially proportionate." See Spitz, supra note 2, at 630.
Notably, a ratio with a 10.5% discrepancy between the percentage of female stu-
dent-athletes and the percentage of females in the student body was found not to
be "substantially proportionate." See Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998
F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993) (Roberts I); see also Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F.
Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa. 1993), affd 7 F.3d 332 (3rd Cir. 1993) (holding 17.8% dis-
crepancy is not "substantially proportionate"); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp.
978 (D.R.I. 1992) (Cohen 1), affid 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding 11.6%
discrepancy is not "substantially proportionate"), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1469
(1997).
25. See 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418. Though it is easy to show a history of expanding
programs for the underrepresented sex, it is much more difficult to prove a con-
tinuing practice in court. See Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 171.
26. See 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418. To meet prong three of the test, the OCR will
consider whether there is an unmet interest in a particular sport, sufficient ability
to sustain a team in that sport and a reasonable expectation of competition for that
team. See id. at 71,417.
27. For a discussion of these decisions, see infra notes 40-64 and accompany-
ing text.
28. See Rikki Ades, The Opportunity to Play Ball: Title IX, University Compliance
and Equal Pay, 13 N.Y.L. SCH.J. HUM. RTS. 347, 358. "Although Title IX legislation
has recently increased, even by 1996, 'only a handful of cases have interpreted
Title IX.' Id. at 358 n.60 (quoting Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F. Supp.
892, 911 (M.D. La. 1996)).
29. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
30. See id. at 574-75. In this case, students receiving federal grant money were
enrolled at Grove City College which itself did not receive any direct federal finan-
cial assistance. See id. at 559. The Court determined that the only "program or
activity" receiving federal financial assistance was the college's financial aid pro-
[Vol. 5: p. 295
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are often funneled through financial aid offices or devoted to fed-
eral research grants and not received directly by athletic depart-
ments,3 1 this decision effectively removed athletic departments
from the purview of Title IX and created a substantial hurdle for
women combating discrimination in intercollegiate athletics.3 2
In response to Grove City, Congress passed the Civil Rights Res-
toration Act,33 over a presidential veto, which gave Title IX a con-
siderably broader reading and statutorily overruled Grove City.34
With revised definitions,3 5 the revamped Title IX adopted an "insti-
tution-wide" approach, establishing that "an entire institution must
comply with Title IX in order to receive federal aid for any program
or activity."36
After the Supreme Court held that an implied right of action
for private litigants existed under Title IX37 and that compensatory
damages and legal fees can be awarded to a prevailing plaintiff,38
the playing field was leveled for underrepresented student-athletes
(principally women), kicking off a blitz of litigation.3 9
In Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania,40 the Third Circuit
held that the school's elimination of women's field hockey and
gram. Id. at 572. In a prophetic dissent foreshadowing eventual Congressional
response, Justice Brennan characterized the majority's decision as absurd:
According to the Court, the 'financial aid program' at Grove City College
may not discriminate on the basis of sex because it is covered by Title IX,
but the college is not prohibited from discriminating in its admissions, its
athletic programs, or even its various academic departments. If anything
about Title IX were ever certain, it is that discriminatory practices like the
one just described were meant to be prohibited by the statute.
Id. at 601-02 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
31. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 894 (1st Cir. 1993) (Cohen I11),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1469 (1997).
32. See Marshall, supra note 4, at 846; Johnson, supra note 3, at 564; Jennifer L.
Henderson, Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics: A Commitment to Fairness, 5 SETON
HALLJ. SPORT L. 133, 137 (1995).
33. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28
(1988) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1990)).
34. See id. For a discussion of Grove City, see supra text accompanying notes
30-32.
35. See 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988). "'[P] rogram or activity' and 'program' mean
all of the operations of a college, university, or other post-secondary institution, or
a public system of higher education, ... any part of which is extended Federal
financial assistance .... Id.
36. Cynthia J. Harris, The Reform of Women's Intercollegiate Athletics: Title IX,
Equal Protection, and Supplemental Methods, 20 CAP. U. L. REv. 691, 698 (1991); see
Thomas S. Evans, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: A Primer on Current Legal Issues,
5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 55, 57 (1994).
37. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 667 (1979).
38. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
39. See infra notes 40-64 and accompanying text.
40. 7 F.3d 332 (3rd Cir. 1993).
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gymnastics teams constituted a violation of Title IX.41 Applying the
three-part test, the district court held that the school did not meet
the substantial proportionality prong because a 17.8% discrepancy
existed between the percentage of female students and the percent-
age of female athletes.42 The university also failed the second
prong, which requires a history and continuing practice of program
expansion, because the proposed cuts would have decreased the
number of women's varsity teams to seven, down from an all-time
high of ten in 1992.43 Finally, the plaintiffs' testimony indicated
that interest, competition and player quality existed for the ex-
pelled teams. 44 Accordingly, the court determined that there was
no full and effective accommodation of women's interests and
abilities. 45
Faced with an analogous situation in Roberts v. Colorado State
Board of Agriculture,46 the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's
finding and application of the three-part test for compliance. 47 In
response to economic constraints, Colorado State University (CSU)
announced its intent to discontinue its men's baseball and women's
fast-pitch softball programs. 48 Members of the women's fast-pitch
team opted to play hardball, suing the school for both reinstate-
ment and compensatory damages.49 Applying the test to CSU's ac-
tions, the district court held the following: (1) a 10.5% discrepancy
between the percentage of female students to female athletes was
41. See id.
42. See Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 584-85 (1993). In the
1990-91 academic year, 10,793 undergraduate students were enrolled at Indiana
University of Pennsylvania (IUP), 4790 (44.4%) of which were men, 6003 (55.6%)
of which were women. See id. The eighteen varsity teams in IUP's athletic program
rostered 503 athletes, 313 (62.2%) of which were men, 190 (37.8%) of which were
women. See id.
43. See id. at 585. The 1991 cuts decreased the opportunities for women to
compete "and the 1991 cuts were not responsive to the needs, interests, and abili-
ties of women students." Id.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993) (Roberts I). At the district court level, Colo-
rado State University was the defendant. The Colorado Board of Agriculture,
which operates Colorado State University, took over the appeal and was the named
appellant when the case went to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. See id.
at 825.
47. See Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (1993).
48. See Roberts v. Colorado State University, 814 F. Supp. 1507, 1518 (D. Colo.
1993). The decision to cut these sports eliminated 18 varsity participation oppor-
tunities for women and 55 such opportunities for men. See id. at 1514.
49. See id. at 1509-10.
[Vol. 5: p. 295
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not "substantially proportionate"; 50 (2) while the University had ad-
ded eleven women's sports during the 1970s, it dropped four wo-
men's sports between 1980 and 1992 and decreased the total
number of participation opportunities for women, clearly demon-
strating a failure to expand women's sports;51 and (3) since the
plaintiffs desired to play softball and had a talented squad prior to
the cuts, CSU did not fully and effectively accommodate its wo-
men's athletic interests and abilities.52
50. See id. at 1512. The court found that, after Colorado State lost its softball
team, women comprised 48.2% of the student body, but only 37.7% of the varsity
athletes. See id.
51. See id. at 1514. The district court had little trouble finding that CSU failed
to satisfy prong two, given CSU's inability to live up to their own Title IX compli-
ance plan. See id. at 1515. CSU argued that by adding eleven women's teams in
the 1970s it complied with the second prong of the test. See id. The Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that this argument was flawed because it reads
the words "'continuing practice' out of this prong of the test." Roberts II, 998 F.2d
at 830. Despite the economic circumstances leading to CSU's quandary, the court
failed to excuse the school:
We recognize that in times of economic hardship, few schools will be able
to satisfy Title IX's effective accommodation requirement by continuing
to expand their women's athletics programs. Nonetheless, the ordinary
meaning of the word 'expansion' may not be twisted to find compliance
under this prong when schools have increased the relative percentages of
women participating in athletics by making cuts in both men's and wo-
men's sports programs. Financially strapped institutions may still comply
with Title IX by cutting athletic programs such that men's and women's
participation rates become substantially proportionate to their represen-
tation in the undergraduate population.
Id.
See also Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 898-99 n.15 (1st Cir. 1993) (Cohen
I]):
[T]itle IX does not require that a school pour ever-increasing sums into
athletic establishment. If a university prefers to take another route, it can
also bring itself into compliance with the first benchmark of the accom-
modation test by subtraction and down grading, that is, by reducing op-
portunities for the overrepresented gender while keeping opportunities
stable for the underrepresented gender (or reducing them to a much
lesser extent).
Id.
52. See Roberts I, 814 F. Supp. at 1517-18. At trial, several members of the team
testified to the time and effort they had devoted to the sport and the Rams' softball
team. See id. Additionally, they noted CSU's recent success, including a 1992
third place finish in the Western Athletic Conference. See id. Upholding the dis-
trict court's findings, the Tenth Circuit discussed the simplicity of applying the
third prong to such a scenario: "Questions . . . under this third prong will be less
vexing when plaintiffs seek the reinstatement of an established team rather than
the creation of a new one. Here, plaintiffs were members of a successful varsity
softball team that played a competitive schedule as recently as the spring of 1992."
Roberts II, 998 F.2d at 832 (citations omitted); cf. Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F.
Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (Cook 1), vacated as moot 992 F.2d 17 (2nd Cir. 1993)
(Cook I) (directing Colgate University to promote women's ice hockey team from
club level to varsity level, status which it had not previously occupied). The Cook II
court vacated the district court's decision as moot, reasoning that all of the named
7
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In Kelley v. Board of Trustees,53 the men's swimming team
brought suit against the University of Illinois after the school
dropped men's swimming, men's fencing and men's and women's
diving. 54 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that
the university's decision was not a violation of Title IX because the
percentage of male athletes, even after eliminating men's swim-
ming, was considerably greater than the percentage of total male
students. 55 The student-athletes challenged the legislative under-
pinnings of Title IX on several grounds. First, they claimed that
Title IX "'has through some alchemy of bureaucratic regulation
been transformed from a statute which prohibits discrimination on
the basis of sex into a statute that mandates discrimination against
males."56 Dismissing this argument, the court held that it must
accord "considerable deference" to an agency's interpretation of a
plaintiffs had either graduated, or planned to do so, before Colgate was required
to elevate the status of the women's hockey team. See Cook II, 992 F.2d at 19. Also,
the district court used the antidiscrimination bases of Title VII, not the three-
prong test of Title IX, to examine Colgate's actions. See Cook I, 802 F. Supp. at 743.
Cook suggests that if underrepresented athletes can demonstrate adequate interest,
quality and competitiveness, their program can command varsity status even if the
program never previously enjoyed varsity status. See Shook, supra note 16, at 792.
Readdressing Roberts, it is notable that, in the course of rejecting CSU's argu-
ment that the school had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for cutting base-
ball and softball, the district court explained that Title IX lacks any intent
requirement when evaluating a discriminatory practice: "[A] financial crisis cannot
justify gender discrimination." Roberts I, 814 F. Supp. at 1518.
53. 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994) (Kelley I).
54. See id.
55. See id. at 270. The court noted that if the percentage of athletes of a
particular sex is substantially proportionate to that sex's percentage of the student
body, the athletic interests of that sex are presumed to be accommodated. See id.;
see also Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 898. History also worked against the plaintiffs in Kelley.
See Shook, supra note 16 at 794. In 1982, the University of Illinois avoided being
charged with Title IX violations after representing to the OCR that it would rem-
edy the disparity in female athletic opportunities within a reasonable period of
time. See Kelley II, 35 F.3d at 270. But when this case came before the court over a
decade later, women accounted for 44% of the student body, but only 23.4% of
Fighting Illini athletes. See id. At the district court level, the male swimmers main-
tained that the loss of athletic opportunities at the University of Illinois should be
shared equally between genders. See Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 832 F. Supp. 237,
244 (C.D. Ill. 1993). The Seventh Circuit, however, highlighted the school's pru-
dential decision to keep women's swimming:
If the [u]niversity had terminated the women's swimming program, it
would have been vulnerable to a finding that it was in violation of Title
IX. Female participation would have continued to be substantially dis-
proportionate to female enrollment, and women with a demonstrated in-
terest in intercollegiate athletic activity and demonstrated ability to
compete would be left without an opportunity to participate in their
sport.
Kelley II, 35 F.3d at 269-70 (citations omitted).
56. Kelley II, 35 F.3d at 270 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 5: p. 295
8
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol5/iss2/4
COHEN V. BROWN
statute that the agency is empowered to enforce.5 7 The student-
athletes further argued that the substantial proportionality test of
the policy interpretation established a gender-based quota, a result
contrary to the propositions of Title IX.58 The court held that the
policy interpretation does not mandate any type of statistical bal-
ancing or quotas, but instead "creates a presumption that a school
is in compliance with Title IX... when it achieves such a statistical
balance." 59
In Pederson v. Louisiana State University,60 a district court threw
Title IX jurisprudence a curveball when it rejected the rationales
supporting the holdings in Favia, Roberts and Cohen.61 The court
refused to accept the emerging, but erroneous, assumption that an
institution is not in compliance with Title IX simply because it lacks
numerical proportionality between the athletic departments and
the student body.62 Noting that other circuits placed inordinate
emphasis on the "substantial proportionality" prong of the test, the
court held that ceasing a Title IX inquiry at the point of numerical
57. See id. The student-athletes claimed that the applicable regulation, 34
C.F.R. § 106.41, and the policy interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71, 418 (1979), warped
the purpose of Title IX. See id. The Seventh Circuit, relying on Supreme Court
precedent disagreed, holding that an agency's interpretation of a statute is to be
abided by unless that interpretation is manifestly contrary to the statute's objec-
tives. See id.; see also Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (mandating that where Congress has expressly delegated
to agency power to "elucidate a specific provision of a statute by regulation," result-
ing regulations should be given "controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capri-
cious, or manifestly contrary to the statute"). The Kelley II court found that the
regulation and the policy interpretation were not "manifestly contrary" to the
objectives of Title IX, thus enjoying a presumption of validity. Kelley II, 35 F.3d at
271.
58. See Kelley II, 35 F.3d at 271.
59. Id. The court added that if substantial proportionality is lacking, a school
can establish Title IX compliance by either of the other two prongs of the test. See
id. Thus, it can either demonstrate a history and continuing practice of expansion
for the underrepresented sex or show that existing programs effectively accommo-
date the interest of that sex. See id.
60. 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996). Though the suit was reassigned to the
Western District, the case remained filed with the Middle District of Louisiana. See
id.
61. See id. at 913-14.
62. See id. at 913. The court reasoned:
To accept the interpretation in [Roberts and Cohen] and the argument
made by the defendants [LSU], one must assume that the interest and
ability to participate in sports is equal between all men and women on all
campuses. For instance, if a university has 50% female students and 50%
male students, the assumption under this argument must follow that the
same percentage of its male population as its female population has the
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proportionality does not comport with the mandate of the statute.
Instead, an appropriate reading of the policy interpretation "allows
for consideration of all factors listed therein in determining
whether the university has provided equal opportunity and levels of
competition for males and females. ' 63 Despite the court's new Title
IX logic, the university was found to be in violation of Tide IX be-
cause it desperately failed to meet either of the other two prongs of
the test: the school lacked a history of expansion of opportunities
for women and failed to effectively accommodate the interests and
abilities of would-be athletes.64
III. FACTS
Amy Cohen's decision to bring a Title IX suit against Brown
University's athletic department gave the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit its first opportunity to rule on the statute and its appli-
cations to college athletics. 65 Brought in 1992, the Cohen case had a
five-year history. Although it acted as a starting block for other Ti-
63. Id. at 914. Supporting its finding that too much weight was accorded to
numerical proportionality and that substantial disproportionality is only evidence,
not proof, of sex discrimination, the Pederson court highlighted a number of regu-
latory anomalies and oversights contained in the administrative history of Title IX.
See id. at 910, 914. For example, the policy interpretation was immediately effective
despite not being approved by the President. See id. at 910. The policy interpreta-
tion lacks the binding effect of the rules, regulations and orders authorized by 20
U.S.C. § 1682. See id. With these precursors, the court reasoned:
Title IX, § 1682 authorizes the effectuation of the provisions of Title IX
by "issuing rules, regulations or orders of general applicability which shall
be consistent with the achievements of the objective of the statute author-
izing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is
taken." Interestingly, § 1682 of Title IX also provides "no such rule, regu-
lation or order shall become effective unless and until approved by the
President." The Policy Interpretation effective December 11, 1979 was
never submitted to the President for approval ....
Id. at 910 n.45.
64. See id. at 915-16. The plaintiffs, a class of female students with the interest
and ability to play intercollegiate fast-pitch softball, maintained that interest in fast-
pitch softball existed in 1979, when LSU fielded its first team. See id. at 915. Since
then, local, regional and national interest and participation had increased mark-
edly. See id. The court also determined that "LSU has demonstrated a practice not
to expand women's athletics at the university before it became absolutely necessary
to do so" because it had not added a women's sport in fourteen years. Id. at 916.
These findings, coupled with a substantial disproportionality between the percent-
ages of female students to female athletes at LSU, caused the court to hold that
LSU violated Title IX. See id.
65. See Donald C. Mahoney, Taking a Shot at the Title: A Critical Review ofJudicial
and Administrative Interpretations of Title IX as Applied to Intercollegiate Athletic Pro-
grams, 27 CONN. L. REV. 943, 954-55 (1995).
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tle IX litigation,66 this case only recently crossed the finish line.67
In the interim, the applicable laws have changed in some respects. 68
Brown University offered an extensive athletic program for its
students, funding thirteen intercollegiate sports for women and
twelve sports for men.69 In addition to these squads, Brown recog-
nized, but did not fund, another seven "donor-funded" varsity
teams. 70 Four teams were all-male and three teams were all-fe-
male.7' Although the number of varsity sports offered to each sex
were equal, due to the selection of sports offered, the number of
athletic opportunities was greater for male athletes than it was for
female athletes, partly because no female sport has a roster as large
as the men's football roster. 72
In May 1991, in response to a campus-wide cost-cutting direc-
tive, Brown demoted four teams (women's gymnastics, women's vol-
leyball, men's water polo and men's golf) from university-funded to
66. See Kelley II, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994); Favia, 7 F.3d 332 (3rd Cir. 1993);
Roberts II, 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993); Pederson, 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La.
1996). Each of these cases allude to the Title IX suit brought by Cohen against
Brown; see also Cohen III, 879 F. Supp. 185, 188 (D.R.I. 1995) ("At the time of [Co-
hen I], there was virtually no case law on point. Since issuance of the First Circuit's
opinion [in Cohen I/], a number of other circuits have been faced with Title IX
athletic discrimination suits.") (citations omitted).
67. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995) (Cohen III), affd
in part, rev'd in part, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (Cohen IV), cert. denied, 117 U.S.
1469 (1997); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992), affd, 991 F.2d
888 (1st Cir. 1993).
68. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S.Ct. 2264 (1996); Adarand Constr. Inc.
v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). During the five-year span of the Cohen litigation,
the Supreme Court handed down two decisions that affected this case. These deci-
sions involved discrimination and equal protection issues, altered the constitu-
tional law in this area and overruled Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547
(1990), a case relied on by the Cohen II court. For discussion of these cases, see
infra notes 103-06, 121-22 and accompanying text.
69. See Cohen III, 879 F. Supp. at 188-89.
70. See id. at 189. Brown requires "donor-funded" teams to raise their own
money for things such as uniforms, equipment and facility use. See id. On the
other hand, Brown provides financial support for teams that are "university-
funded." See id. Brown also does not guarantee that donor-funded teams will be
provided with coaching, equipment, or money for travel or post-season competi-
tion, but Brown guarantees each of these amenities to university-funded teams. See
id. at 189 n.7. As a result, a number of donor-funded varsities have experienced
difficulty trying to field competitive teams. See id. at 189-90.
71. See id. at 189.
72. See id. During the 1993-94 school year, there were 897 athletes at Brown,
555 men (61.9%) and 342 women (38.1%). See id. at 192. The undergraduate
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donor-funded status. 73 In response to the demotion, female mem-
bers of the gymnastics and volleyball teams brought suit against the
university claiming that the university violated Title IX. The district
court stayed the demotion of the two women's teams until the case
was resolved on its merits.7 4 The Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's decision to grant a preliminary in-
junction, concluding that an institution violates Title IX if it
ineffectively accommodates its students' interests and abilities. 75
On remand, the district court determined that Brown's intercollegi-
ate athletic program violated Title IX and its attendant
regulations. 76
In Cohen IV, Brown challenged the lower court's utilization of
the three-prong test on constitutional and statutory grounds; Brown
also argued that the Court of Appeals was not bound by the prior
panel's assessment and application of the law in Cohen 1.77 The
Court of Appeals disagreed, maintaining that Cohen II acts as con-
trolling authority.78
73. See id. at 188. Of the $77,823 Brown expected to save each year as a result
of these demotions, more than $62,000 came from the women's athletic budget
while less than $16,000 came from the men's budget. See id. at 188 n.2.
74. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978, 1005 (D.R.I. 1992) (Cohen 1).
75. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 897 (1st Cir. 1993) (Cohen I1).
76. See Cohen I/, 879 F. Supp. at 214. Pursuant to an order from the district
court, Brown composed a Title IX compliance plan. See Cohen v. Brown Univ.,
101 F.3d 155, 162 (1st Cir. 1996) (Cohen MV). The district court rejected this plan
and fashioned specific relief to avoid further litigation and to expedite the appeal
on the issue of Brown's liability. See id. In Cohen TV, the First Circuit found that the
district court erred in substituting relief in place of Brown's proposal to comply
with Title IX by cutting men's sports until it achieved substantial proportionality.
See id. at 185. The court of appeals opined, "[o]ur respect for academic freedom
and reluctance to interject ourselves into the conduct of university affairs counsels
that we give universities as much freedom as possible in conducting their opera-
tions consonant with constitutional and statutory limits." Id. at 187-88. Denying
the district court's remedy was the only component of the Cohen III holding that
the Cohen IVcourt overturned. See id.
77. See Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 162. The Cohen 1/Vcourt noted that in Cohen , a
panel of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit "elucidated the applicable legal
framework, upholding the substance of the district court's interpretation and ap-
plication of the law in granting plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, and
rejecting essentially the same legal arguments Brown makes here." Id. (footnote
omitted).
78. See id. Asserting that the "law of the case" doctrine applied and thus, that
the decisions made by the Cohen H court are binding, the Cohen Vcourt refused to
undertake plenary review of the issues already decided. See id.
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The Majority Rules In Favor of Cohen
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit addressed the issue
of whether Brown University's demotion of the women's gymnastics
and volleyball teams from university-funded status to donor-funded
status constituted a lack of effective accommodation of its students'
interests and abilities in athletics under Title IX. 79
At the outset of its opinion, the court stressed that in Cohen II, a
different panel of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected
Brown's constitutional and statutory challenges to the Policy Inter-
pretation's three-part test, thus precluding the Cohen IV court from
reviewing those issues.8 0 Therefore, the rulings of Cohen II gov-
erned Cohen IV8 1
79. See Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 161. While addressing this issue, the court noted
that Title IX is an anti-discrimination statute and is modeled after Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id. at 167; see also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677, 696 (1979) (noting that Title IX's drafters explicitly assumed that it
would be interpreted and applied in the same fashion as Title VI had been ap-
plied). Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis
of race, color or national origin in institutions benefiting from federal funds. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994). The Cohen Vcourt pointed out that Title IX and Title
VI share the same constitutional underpinnings. See Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 167.
Discussing the goals of Title IX, the court stated, "According to the statute's spon-
sor (Senator Bayh), Title IX was intended to provide for the women of America
something that is rightfully theirs - an equal chance to attend the schools of their
choice, to develop the skills they want, and to apply those skills ...." Id.
80. See Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 167. This concept, termed "the law of the case
doctrine," mandates, "[a] decision of an appellate court on an issue of law ...
governs the issue during all subsequent stages of litigation in the [lower] court and
thereafter on any further appeal." See id. at 167-68 (quoting Commercial Union
Ins. Co. v. Walbrook Ins. Co., 41 F.3d 764, 769 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing United States
v. Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d 148 (1st Cir. 1991))). Though the "law of the case"
doctrine can be circumvented, the court held that no exception to the doctrine
applied. See id. at 168. The Cohen Vcourt would only reopen a previously decided
issue on appeal if: 1) the evidence in a subsequent trial was substantially different;
2) controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of law applicable to
such issues; or 3) the decision was clearly erroneous and would work manifest in-
justice. See id.
81. See id. at 169. Adhering to the law of the case doctrine, the court con-
ceded that "conclusions and holdings regarding the merits of issues presented on
appeal from a grant of preliminary injunction are to be understood as statements
as to probable outcomes." Id. (emphasis added). The court also noted that when
asked to rule on the propriety of a district court's grant of a preliminary injunc-
tion, it sometimes must do so without benefit of full argument and a well-devel-
oped record. See id. In this case, however, the court rationalized that the record
before the Cohen II court was "sufficiently developed and the facts necessary to
shape the proper legal matrix [we] re sufficiently clear." Id. (quoting Cohen II, 991
F.2d at 904). Finally, the court declared that because the precedent established by
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After establishing the precedential foundation of the case, the
court stressed that the district court's interpretation and applica-
tion of the three-part test was appropriate and did not metamor-
phose Title IX into an "affirmative action" statute as Brown
suggested.8 2 Rather, Tide IX is an anti-discrimination statute, and
like other anti-discrimination schemes, it supports an inference that
a gender-based statistical disparity indicates discriminatory prac-
tices.83 The court stressed that merely because a gender-conscious
remedy results from ajudicial determination of discrimination does
not mean that the remedy constitutes affirmative action.8 4
The First Circuit then undertook a liability analysis and con-
cluded that the law of the case doctrine required it to follow the
mandate of Cohen IL.85 Additionally, the court remarked that every
circuit that reviewed a Title IX claim since Cohen II agreed with its
explication of the Title IX regime as it applies to athletics. 8 6 In
Cohen IV, just as in Cohen II and Cohen III, the court found that the
OCR's Policy Interpretation is entitled to substantial deference be-
cause it is the enforcing agency's construction of its own regula-
tions.87 The Cohen JVcourt then held that the district court did not
82. See id. at 169-70. The court elaborated, "[t]rue affirmative action cases
have historically involved a voluntary undertaking to remedy discrimination (as in
a program implemented by a governmental body, or by a private employer or insti-
tution), by means of specific group-based preferences or numerical goals, and a
specific timetable for achieving those goals." Id. at 170. (footnote omitted). Stat-
ing that Title IX is, instead, an anti-discrimination statute modeled after Title VI,
the court continued, "[n]o aspect of the Title IX regime at issue in this case -
inclusive of the statute, the relevant regulation, and the pertinent agency docu-
ments - mandates gender-based preferences or quotas, or specific timetables for
implementing numerical goals." Id.
83. See id. at 170-71. Supporting this presumption, the court suggested that
the substantial proportionality test is not dispositive, but merely a starting point for
analysis - and is thus only one component of the inquiry into whether an institu-
tion complies with Title IX. See id. at 171. Accordingly, the substantial proportion-
ality test should not be applied mechanically, but on a case-by-case basis. See id.
84. See Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 172. Similarly, the court indicated that gender-
conscious remedies are both appropriate and constitutionally permissible under a
federal anti-discrimination regime, although such remedial measures are still sub-
ject to equal protection review. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id. In cases with similar fact patterns, the Third, Seventh and Tenth
Circuits followed the lead of Cohen II, as did a Sixth Circuit case involving high
school athletics. See id. However, a district court case awaiting review by the Court
of Appeals for the Thirteenth Circuit did not follow the rationale of Cohen II and
its progeny. See Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La.
1996). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
87. See Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 172-73; see also supra note 56 and accompanying
text (discussing Supreme Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., which held that if Congress has expressly given to
agency power to promulgate specific provision of statute by regulation, resulting
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err in the degree of deference it accorded the regulation and the
appropriate agency declarations.88
The court proceeded to renounce Brown's "relative interest"
approach to the three-part test.89 Restating the position taken by
the First Circuit court in Cohen II, the court concluded that Brown
read the term "fully" out of an institution's duty to "fully and effec-
tively" accommodate its students' interests and abilities.90 Brown
further argued that the interpretation of the three-part test in Cohen
III requires numerical proportionality, thus imposing a gender-
based quota which is in contravention to Title IX.91 The court sim-
ply responded that the three-part test does not require preferential
or disparate treatment for either gender; and that "[n] either the
Policy Interpretation's three-part tests, nor the district court's inter-
pretation of it mandates statistical balancing."9 2
regulations shall be given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious
or contrary to statute).
88. See Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 173.
89. See id. at 174. The court characterized Brown's argument as suggesting
that athletic departments satisfy prong three of the three-part test by meeting the
interests and abilities of the underrepresented gender to the same extent that
those departments meet the interests and abilities of the overrepresented gender.
See id.
90. See id. (quoting Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 899). Brown asserted that the district
court's interpretation of "fully" in Cohen III "requires universities to favor women's
teams and treat them better than men's [teams] .. .forces them to eliminate or
cap men's teams ... [and] forces universities to impose athletic quotas in excess of
relative interests and abilities." Id. at 174. (quoting Appellants' Brief at 55).
91. See id. Brown's contention, that the three-part test interpreting Title IX
establishes a quota, rests on a plain language reading of 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (b) which
provides:
Nothing in subsection (a) of this section shall be interpreted to require
any educational institution to grant preferential or disparate treatment to
the members of one sex on account of an imbalance which may exist with
respect to the total number or percentage of persons of that sex partici-
pating in or receiving the benefits of any federally supported program or
activity, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of
that sex in any community, State, section or other area .
20 U.S.C. § 1681(b).
The Cohen Vcourt discounted this argument by claiming that § 1681(b) was
modeled after 703(j) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) and "was specifically
designed to prohibit quotas in university admissions and hiring, based upon the
percentage of individuals of one gender in a geographical community." See Cohen
IV, 101 F.3d at 174-75.
92. Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 175. Furthermore, the court declared that: (1) be-
cause a Title IX plaintiff must prove that there is a statistical disparity between the
gender composition of the student body and its athletic program and that unmet
interest exists and (2) because an institution can demonstrate, as an affirmative
defense, a showing of a history and continuing practice of program expansion for
the underrepresented gender, that the Title IX liability assessment "is a far cry
from a one-step imposition of a gender-based quota." See id.
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The court also refused to accept Brown's contention that the
disparity between the number of male athletes and female athletes
at Brown is due to a difference in interest levels in athletics. 93 The
court faulted history and society for any such discrepancies9 4 and
declared that "even if it can be empirically demonstrated that, at a
particular time, women have less interest in sports than do men,
such evidence standing alone, cannot justify providing fewer ath-
letic opportunities for women than for men."95 The First Circuit
also noted that the question of whether a school has fully and effec-
tively accommodated the athletic interests and abilities of its stu-
dent body is easily answered when student-athletes seek to reinstate
what were formerly successful university-funded teams.96
The court then disposed of Brown's Fifth Amendment equal
protection challenge to Title IX's statutory scheme. 97 Brown, rely-
ing on the Supreme Court's decision in Adarand Construction Inc. v.
Pena,98 asserted that "[t] he [equal protection] violation arises from
the court's holding that Title IX requires the imposition of quotas,
preferential treatment, and disparate treatment in the absence of a
compelling state interest and a determination that the remedial
measure is 'narrowly tailored' to serve that interest."99 The Cohen IV
court rejected Brown's argument by noting that the new law estab-
lished in Adarand was inapplicable to the disposition of the appeal
and, thus, the Cohen III court's application of the law was consistent
with the interpretation expounded by the First Circuit in Cohen
1.100
In rejecting Brown's equal protection claim, the Cohen II court
noted that, under the Fifth Amendment, Congress possesses a
broad ability to remedy past discrimination.1 0 ' The Cohen II court
93. See id. at 178-81.
94. See id. at 178-79. The court suggested that interest and ability do not de-
velop in a vacuum but rather, they evolve as a function of opportunity and experi-
ence. See id. at 179. The court also highlighted the Policy Interpretation's
recognition that women's lower rate of participation in athletics is reflective of the
historical lack of opportunities for women to participate in sports. See id.
95. Id. at 180.
96. See id. at 180; see also Cohen I, 809 F. Supp. at 992 ("Brown is cutting off
varsity opportunities where there is still great interest and talent, and where Brown
still has an imbalance between men and women varsity athletes in relation to their
undergraduate enrollments."). Notably, students have demonstrated interest and
ability to participate in intercollegiate athletics even when a school has not previ-
ously fielded a varsity team in the desired sport. See Shook, supra note 16, at 792.
97. See Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 181-85.
98. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
99. See Cohen I, 101 F.3d at 181.
100. See id.
101. See Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 901.
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cited two Supreme Court cases supporting this proposition, includ-
ing Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,10 2 a case which has since been
overruled in part 10 3 The Cohen IVcourt stressed that Adarand's par-
tial overruling of Metro Broadcasting does not apply to the areas of
law at issue in Cohen 11,104 and even if it did, "[f]or the last twenty
years, the Supreme Court has applied intermediate scrutiny to all
cases requiring equal protection challenges to gender-based
classifications." 10 5
Under the intermediate scrutiny test, the court had little
trouble finding the district court's remedial order constitutional. 10 6
It found that "avoid [ing] the use of federal resources to support
discriminatory practices" and "provid[ing] individual citizens effec-
tive protection against those practices" were important governmen-
tal objectives. 10 7  Additionally, the court held that judicial
enforcement of federal anti-discrimination statutes also is an impor-
tant objective.108 Under the intermediate scrutiny evaluation, the
court found that the means used by the district court to fashion
relief for the statutory violation were substantially related to impor-
tant governmental objectives. 10 9
The court completed its constitutional analysis by reiterating
that Tide IX is distinguished from other anti-discrimination
schemes because it is impossible to determine compliance or to de-
102. 497 U.S. 547 (1990). In Metro Broadcasting, the Court held that Congress
need not make specific findings of discrimination to grant race-conscious relief.
See id. at 565-66. Metro Broadcasting subjected race conscious classification to inter-
mediate scrutiny. See id. at 564. When a court evaluates a classification under an
"intermediate scrutiny" standard, the court will uphold the classification if it serves
an "important" government interest and has a "substantial relationship" to the
achievement of that goal. See Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 183-84; see aISoJOHN E. NowAK
& RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15.3, at 603 (5th ed. 1995). This
sort of remedial measure is considered a "benign gender classification." See id. at
782.
103. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111-12. Adarand explicitly overruled Metro
Broadcasting in its holding that "all racial classifications, imposed by whatever fed-
eral, state, or local government actor must be analyzed by a reviewing court under
strict scrutiny [as] there is no way of determining what classifications are 'benign'
or 'remedial.'" Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112-13. A less flexible standard than inter-
mediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny requires a classification to serve a "compelling"
government interest and be "narrowly tailored" to promote that interest. See No-
wAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 102, at 602.
104. See Cohen TV 101 F.3d at 182. The court declared that the Adarand deci-
sion is limited explicitly to race-based classifications. See id.
105. Id. at 183.
106. See id. at 184.
107. Id. (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 667 (1979)).
108. See id.
109. See Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 184.
1998]
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vise a remedy without comparing opportunities while specifically
considering gender.110 Furthermore, gender-conscious remedial
schemes are constitutional if they directly protect the interests of
the disproportionately burdened gender.'1 ' The court employed
this rationale in denying Brown's argument that cutting men's
sports violates prong three, since the interests of male athletes, like
the interests of the female athletes, were not fully and effectively
accommodated.112
In a separate issue, the court rejected Brown's assertion that
the district court improperly excluded evidence that supported
Brown's relative interests argument. 113
Finally, the court discussed the only portion of Cohen III that it
overruled: the district court's substitution of its own specific relief
in place of Brown's proposal to comply with Title IX by cutting
men's teams until substantial proportionality was achieved. 114 Cit-
ing "respect for academic freedom and reluctance to interject our-
selves into the conduct of university affairs," the court granted
Brown the opportunity to adjust its operations in any fashion that
was within constitutional and statutory bounds.1 15
B. The Dissent Disputes the Call
In his dissent, Chief Judge Torruella agreed with the majority
in recognizing the "law of the case" doctrine as binding precedent
110. See id. The court added that, even if the three-part test favored women, it
is appropriate to consider gender in establishing a remedy for a Title IX violation
as it "serves the important objective of 'ensur[ing] that in instances where overall
athletic opportunities decrease, the actual opportunities available to the under-
represented gender do not.'" Id. (quoting Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 35 F.3d
265, 272 (7th Cir. 1994)).
111. See id.
112. See id. The court held that, although a remedy that requires an institu-
tion to cut, add or elevate the status of teams may affect genders differently, such a
remedy is only necessary if there already exists a gender-based disparity in athletic
opportunities. See id. In this case, "it has not been shown that Brown's men's
students will be disadvantaged by the full and effective accommodation of the ath-
letics interests and abilities of its women students." Id. at 184-85.
113. See id. at 185. Brown was prohibited from introducing the NCAA Gender
Equity Study and the results of an undergraduate poll on student interest in athlet-
ics. See id. The court reasoned that since Brown's witnesses relied on facts from
these two studies, the evidence was adequately before the trier of fact. See id.
114. See Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 185. In its order, the district court opined, "[i]t
is clearly in the best interest of both the male and the female athletes to have an
increase in women's opportunities and a small decrease in men's opportunities, if
necessary, rather than, as under Brown's plan, no increase in women's opportuni-
ties and a large decrease in men's opportunities." Id. at 187 (quoting District
Court Order at 11-12).
115. Id. at 187-88.
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in successive stages of the same litigation. However, Chief Judge
Torruella noted that decisions of the Supreme Court, which were
rendered between two appeals and are irreconcilable with the deci-
sion on the first appeal, must be followed on the second appeal. 116
The dissent went on to discuss the two Supreme Court cases which
have changed the applicable jurisprudence and suggested that Co-
hen IVshould have been decided differently. 117
The dissent highlighted that the presumption relied on by the
Cohen II court, that a "regulation slanted in favor of women [or
against men] would be permissible," was based on Metro Broadcast-
ing, a case which has since been overruled. 118 The Supreme
Court's overruling of Metro Broadcasting by Adarand was critical be-
cause it suggested that all gender-conscious government action
should be subjected to strict scrutiny.1 19
The dissent further argued that the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Virginia toughened the standard required to pre-
vail in a gender-discrimination case.' 20 Now, rather than applying
the "substantial relation to an important government interest" test,
courts must examine the constitutionality of a statute mandating
gender-based government action by determining whether the gov-
ernment demonstrates an "exceedingly persuasive justification for
that action." 121
Relatedly, the dissent pointed out that these issues were not
considered during this litigation since Cohen Ilwas an appeal from a
preliminary injunction. 122 As a result, the ruling in Cohen II should
116. See id. at 188 (Torruella, C.J., dissenting).
117. See infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
118. Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 189 (Torruella, C.J., dissenting). In Adarand, the
Supreme Court held that "all racial classifications . . . must be analyzed ... under
strict scrutiny." Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113. Although Metro Broadcasting and
Adarand dealt solely with race-conscious, rather than gender-conscious classifica-
tions, the standard in Metro Broadcasting was applied in Cohen I. See Cohen IV, 101
F.3d at 189 (Torruella, C.J., dissenting) (citing Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 901).
119. See Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 189-90 (Torruella, C.J., dissenting).
120. 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2274 (1996).
121. Id.
122. See Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 191 (Torruella, C.J., dissenting). The dissent
discussed the limited influence of Cohen II:
The binding authority of Cohen II, therefore, is lessened by the fact that it
was an appeal from a preliminary injunction. First, we now have a full
record before us and a set of well-defined legal questions presented by
the appellant. Trial on the merits has served to focus these questions and
to provide background that allows us to consider these questions in the
proper context and in detail. In its decision in Cohen II, this court recog-
nized and indeed, emphasized the fact that its holding was only
preliminary.
Id. (citations omitted) (Torruella, C.J., dissenting).
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not have been unquestionably promoted into a permanent ruling.
Instead, the dissent suggested that the fully developed issues should
have been considered with the full complement of available facts.123
The dissent then attacked the district court's construction of
the three-prong test.124 The dissent stated that the manner in
which the district court counted "athletic opportunities" was
skewed because contact sports should have been left out of the
calculus. 125 Relying on the legislative text,126 the dissent noted that
schools are permitted to operate single-sex teams in contact sports
and, if the athletes competing in such sports are excluded from
calculation of participation rates, "the proportion of women partici-
pants would increase dramatically and prong one might be
satisfied."127
The dissent illustrated two reasons why prong two, showing a
history and continuing practice of program expansion for the un-
derrepresented gender, is nearly impossible to meet. First, schools
facing budget constraints must constantly increase the opportuni-
ties available to the underrepresented gender, even if it cannot af-
ford to do so. 128 Second, to satisfy this prong, schools must
123. See id. (Torruella, C.J., dissenting). It is also worthy to the note that the
standard of review has changed. See id. (Torruella, CJ., dissenting). The Cohen II
court declared that it was adopting a deferential standard of review, and "[i]f...
the district court made no clear error of law or fact, we will overturn ... only for
manifest abuse of discretion." Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 902. Because the standard of
review has changed, in that the Cohen /Vcourt must review findings of fact under a
clearly erroneous standard, it is conceivable that the result of the analysis will
change, making review appropriate. See Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 192 (Torruella, CJ.,
dissenting).
124. See Cohen IV 101 F.3d at 192-95 (Torruella, CJ., dissenting).
125. Id. at 192 (Torruella, CJ., dissenting).
126. See id. (Torruella, CJ., dissenting). The regulation provides that an aca-
demic institution may operate separate teams for members of each sex in instances
'where selection of such teams is ...a contact sport." 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b)
(1995).
127. Cohen IV 101 F.3d at 193 (Torruella, CJ., dissenting). Chief Judge Tor-
ruella explained that, under the regulation, a university can choose to field a men-
only football team. See id. at 192 (Torruella, CJ., dissenting). Since different
sports require different-sized rosters, by including in its count a contact sport that
requires very large numbers of participants, "the district court skews the number of
athletic participants." Id. (Torruella, CJ., dissenting).
128. See id. at 193 (Torruella, CJ., dissenting). The dissent suggested that
the Cohen II court erroneously interpreted the purpose of Title IX:
Rather than respecting the school's right to determine the role athletics
will play in the future - including reducing the opportunities available to
the formerly overrepresented gender to ensure proportionate opportuni-
ties - the district court and the majority demand that the absolute number
of opportunities provided to the underrepresented gender be increased.
Id. (Torruella, CJ., dissenting).
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continue to expand their programs and the number of opportuni-
ties for women, irrespective of the women's interest. 129
Moreover, the dissent showed that prong three is open to sev-
eral plausible interpretations. 130 It is unclear whether the "full and
effective accommodation" component of prong three means that
an institution must meet 100% of the underrepresented gender's
unmet reasonable interest and ability, or whether an institution
must meet this interest and ability as fully as it meets those of the
overrepresented gender.131 Also, the dissent pointed out that the
district court's reading of Title IX was troublesome because Title IX
"contains language that prohibits the ordering of preferential treat-
ment on the basis of gender due to a failure of a program to sub-
stantially mirror the gender ratio of an institution."'1 2 Since there
is a variety of reasonable interpretations for the regulations and
statutes at issue, the Cohen IVcourt owed no deference to the inter-
pretation chosen because the choice was made by a lower court, not
the enforcing agency. 133
Next the dissent described that, regardless of semantics, the
district court and the majority in Cohen IV have turned the three-
129. See id. at 193 n.26 (Torruella, C.J., dissenting).
130. See id. at 194 (Torruella, CJ., dissenting).
131. See id. (Torruella, C.J., dissenting). The latter proposed definition of
"full and effective accommodation," meeting the underrepresented gender's un-
met reasonable interest and ability as fully as it meets those of the overrepresented
gender, has support in the Policy Interpretation which provides that in assessing
compliance under the regulation, "the governing principle in this area is that the
athletic interests and abilities of male and female students be equally effectively
accommodated." Policy Interpretation, 44. Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,414.
132. Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 194 (Torruella, C.J., dissenting). The dissent relied
on the language in 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (b) which states that, with respect to Title IX's
guarantee that no person shall be excluded on the basis of sex from participation
in, be denied the benefits of or be subjected to discrimination under any educa-
tional program or activity receiving Federal assistance,
[n]othing contained [therein] shall be interpreted to require any educa-
tional institution to grant preferential or disparate treatment to the mem-
bers of one sex on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect
to the total number or percentage of persons of the sex participating in
or receiving the benefits of any federally supported program or activity,
in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of that sex
in any community.
20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (1994); see alsoJudge, supra note 2, at 316 (emphasizing that,
although Title IX outlaws discrimination, statute does not require strict numerical
equality between sexes).
133. See Cohen X, 101 F.3d at 195 (Torruella, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge
Torruella added, "[t]herefore, like any other cases of statutory interpretation, we
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prong test into a quota.134 The dissent rejected the majority's claim
that the three-prong test does not constitute a quota merely be-
cause it involves multiple prongs. Rather, the dissent suggested
that it is the eventual result of a test, not the number of steps a test
has, which determines if that test is a quota. 135 The dissent then
remarked that since the appellees have not shown an "exceedingly
persuasive justification" for the gender-conscious exercise of gov-
ernment authority, the interpretation of the three-prong test by the
district court and the majority does not pass constitutional
muster. 136
The dissent then disputed the majority's exclusion of evidence
and inconsistent use of statistics. 137 The dissent questioned why the
majority relied on the statistical evaluations concerning participa-
tion rates in Cohen I, Cohen II and Cohen III, but subsequently re-
fused to hear statistical evidence concerning Brown's student
body's interest in athletics. 138 Critical that Brown was not given the
opportunity to demonstrate how it meets its students' interests and
abilities, the dissent opined, "[i]f statistical evidence of interest
levels is not to be considered by courts, . . . there is no way for
schools to determine whether they are in compliance. Any studies
or surveys they might conduct in order to assess their own compli-
ance would, in the event of litigation, be deemed irrelevant. ' 13 9
134. See id. at 195-97. The dissent believed that the district court turned the
three-prong test into an affirmative action, quota-based scheme. See id. at 195; see
also Mahoney, supra note 65, at 944 (insisting that any system requiring certain
number of persons to be given opportunities based solely on one characteristic,
without regard for ability or other classifications, is undeniably quota system).
135. See Cohen I, 101 F.3d at 196 (Torruella, C.J., dissenting). The dissent
plainly stated that any test that requires proportionate participation opportunities
for both sexes (prong one) unless the other sex is disinterested (prong three) is a
quota. See id. (Torruella, C.J., dissenting). The fact that an exception exists for
situations in which there is not a sufficient number of interested students does not
alter the fact that the test is a quota. See id. Commentators have espoused the view
that courts have imposed a de facto quota by applying the three-prong test to an
extreme and, as a result, courts have endorsed the very type of discrimination
based on sex that Title IX was intended to stifle. See Mahoney, supra note 65, at
967.
136. See Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 197 (Torruella, C.J., dissenting). Supporting
this contention, the dissent returned to the Supreme Court's holding in United
States v. Virginia, which stated, "[p]arties who seek to defend gender-based govern-
ment action must demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for that
action." United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2274 (1996).
137. See Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 197-98 (Torruella, C.J., dissenting).
138. See id. at 197 (Torruella, C.J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 198 (Torruella, C.J., dissenting).
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In its holding, the court interpreted and applied the statutory
language of Title IX in a fashion that lost sight of the original goal
of the legislation.1 40
Before identifying the majority's misapplication of Title IX,
however, it must be noted that the court's procedural tack was also
imprecise. When the Supreme Court hands down a decision, this
new decision becomes the preeminent law of the land.141 The new
decision alters or affects the law that controls other cases currently
on appeal. The Supreme Court's decision in Adarand suggested
that gender-based government action, like race-based government
action, are analyzed under strict scrutiny.142 Further, the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Virginia mandated that parties
defending gender-based government action demonstrate an "ex-
ceedingly persuasive justification" for that action. 143 Here, neither
the female athletes nor the district court exhibited an "exceedingly
persuasive" justification for the district court's adoption of an ap-
140. See Andrew A. Ingrum, Civil Rights: Title IX and College Athletics: Is There a
Viable Compromise?, 48 OKLA. L. REv. 755, 773 (1995) (stressing that spirit of Title
IX is to enhance expansion of female athletics but not at ultimate expense of col-
legiate athletics); see also Mahoney, supra note 65, at 976 (suggesting that current
interpretation of Title IX requires schools to make gender-conscious decisions in-
stead of gender-neutral ones); Roy Whitehead, Jr. et al., Gender Equity in College
Athletics After Brown and Louisiana State: Why the Big Boys Are Crying, 32 ARK. L. REV.
10, 40 (1997) (stating that purpose of Title IX legislation is to accommodate inter-
ests and abilities of students who have ability to participate in collegiate sports, not
to establish some mechanical numerical quota based on student population
numbers).
141. See Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 188 (Torruella, C.J., dissenting).
142. SeeAdarand Constr. Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995). Although
Adarand concerned race-based action, that decision compels courts to examine
"benign" gender-conscious government action with the same approach that the
court would view any other gender-conscious government action. See Cohen TV, 101
F.3d at 190 (Torruella, C.J., dissenting).
The Cohen IV majority suggested that allusions to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Adarand as it relates to Cohen IV are misguided because the Cohen H court
relied on Metro Broadcasting to support its claim that Congress has broad powers to
remedy past discrimination. See Cohen I-V 101 F.3d at 182 n.19.
Nonetheless, the Cohen II court used Metro Broadcasting to dispatch Brown's
equal protection argument. See id. at 182. Metro Broadcasting held that "benign"
government action was subject to a lower standard than non-remedial government
action. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564 (1990). This view was
clearly revoked by Adarand. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112-13 (stressing that Metro
Broadcasting was "significant departure" from line of equal protection cases which
had preceded it because it suggested that "benign" government action be treated
less skeptically than other government actions).
143. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2274 (1996). The Supreme
Court emphasized that the enduring, inherent physical differences between men
and women are to be appreciated and respected but should not cause artificial
constraints on an individual's opportunity. See id.
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parent quota scheme, which is clearly a gender-based exercise of
government authority. 144 Thus, the Cohen II decision, accepted by
and relied on by the majority, is not consistent with the Supreme
Court's decisions. Accordingly, Brown's equal protection challenge
of the three-prong test should have been reconsidered in Cohen
IV 145
The other procedural anomaly in Cohen !Vwas the court's strict
adherence to the findings in Cohen I. This sel-imposed straitjacket
and overzealous reverence for the "law of the case doctrine" was
inappropriate and unnecessary because the authority of Cohen II
was weakened by the fact that it was an appeal from a preliminary
injunction. 146 Specifically, the Cohen II court explicitly admitted
that its decision, made at the preliminary injunction stage, enjoys,
at best, tenuous authority and was not necessarily controlling
throughout the duration of the litigation.' 47
In unnecessarily relying on the findings of Cohen II, the Cohen
IV court inherited a flawed application of the three-part test for
compliance adopted by the courts in Cohen II and Cohen IIL' 48 In
Cohen III, the district court declared that Brown failed the first
prong, substantial proportionality, because there was a 13.01% dis-
parity between female participation in athletics and female enroll-
ment.149 This finding was potentially erroneous on two levels.
First, the district court arbitrarily decided that athletic opportuni-
144. See Cohen TV, 101 F.3d at 197 (Torruella, CJ., dissenting). For discussion
of the majority's implementation of Title IX as a quota, see infra notes 135-37 and
accompanying text.
145. See Cohen X, 101 F.3d at 191 (Torruella, CJ., dissenting).
146. Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 191 (Torruella, CJ., dissenting). The dissent
pointed out that in the instant case, the court now has a fully developed record
before it, as well as a complement of appropriately framed legal questions. See id.
(Torruella, CJ., dissenting). The trial on the merits (Cohen III) examined these
questions against an appropriate background, yet the Cohen IV court refused to
fully and properly review these questions due to the court's adherence to the Cohen
II decision. See id. (Torruella, C.J., dissenting).
147. See Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 902 ("[A] party losing the battle on likelihood of
success may nonetheless win the war at a succeeding trial.") (quoting Narragansett
Indian Tribe v. Gilbert, 934 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1991)).
148. See Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 172-80 (discussing appropriateness of previous
courts' interpretations of Title IX and discarding Brown's approach to three-part
test as contrary to language of test as well as contrary to statute itself).
149. See Cohen III, 879 F. Supp. at 211; see also Pederson v. Louisiana State
Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 914 (M.D. La. 1996) ("Ceasing the inquiry at the point of
numerical proportionality does not comport with the mandate of the statute.").
Since the female portion of Brown University's student body was 51.14% (2,926 of
5,722) and the female athletes only constituted 38.13% (342 of 897), the court
concluded, without any analysis of Brown's program or the rationale behind the
first prong of the test, that Brown failed prong one. See Cohen III, 879 F. Supp. at
211.
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ties will be measured by counting the number of participants on
each team, rather than considering how many roster spots were of-
fered to interested students.150 Second, the Policy Interpretation
suggests that the entire student population be entered into the
equation for substantial proportionality, regardless of students' in-
terests in participating in sports. 15 1 The interpretation precariously
presumes that the percentages of each sex in the student body
reflects the size and inclination of the group that is interested in
participating in sports. 15 2 Unfortunately, the Policy Interpretation
proffers no statistical test for schools to apply in determining
whether they are providing athletic opportunities in substantial
proportion to the schools' relative enrollments, leaving schools
to wonder whether they are complying with Title IX. 1 53 In absence
of guidance from the OCR and its Policy Interpretation, as
well as from the courts, collegiate athletic departments are left
150. See Cohen III, 879 F. Supp. at 202. The inherent flaw in this approach is
best demonstrated by the following example: if a women's soccer team has the
capacity to carry twenty-five players on its roster, but only twenty women come out
for the team, the court will find that only twenty opportunities existed, as opposed
to the twenty-five opportunities actually offered.
151. See 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979).
152. See Connolly, supra note 20, at 862-63; see also Charles P. Beveridge, Title
IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: When Schools Cut Men's Athletic Teams, 1996 U. ILL. L.
REv. 809, 834 (1996) (suggesting that forcing colleges to eliminate only men's
sports does not take into consideration male and female students' differing inter-
ests in and abilities to participate in collegiate athletics); George A. Davidson &
Carla A. Kerr, Title IX: What Is Gender Equity, 2 ViLL. SPORTS & ENT. L.F. 25, 29-30
(noting that proportionality requirement is based on unsupported presumption
that percentage of men and women interested in and able to participate in col-
legiate athletics mirrors percentage of men and women enrolled in institution); B.
Glenn George, Who Plays and Who Pays: Defining Equality in Intercollegiate Athletics,
1995 Wis. L. Rv. 647, 655 (1995) (indicating that proportion of female to male
students in student body is not necessarily correlated to number of students with
adequate interest and skill level to participate in intercollegiate athletics); Michael
Straubel, Gender Equity, College Sports, Title IX and Group Rights: A Coach's View, 62
BROo L. REv. 1039, 1066-67 (1996) (demonstrating absurdity of results when
general student body population is used for comparison purposes to determine
whether substantial proportionality exists).
153. See Connolly, supra note 20, at 906. Because no court has found a school
in compliance with the substantial proportionality prong, it is difficult to ascertain
what percentage disparity would be considered in compliance with Title IX. See id.
at 872; see also Beveridge, supra note 152, at 824 (noting that OCR and courts have
failed to determine what percentages would be considered substantial proportion-
ality); Ted Curtis, Men's Sports Programs and Title IX Compliance in Intercollegiate Ath-
letics, 69 FLA. B.J. 63, 65 (arguing that judicial trend seems to drive case-by-case
analysis of Title IX compliance, thus leaving schools with little direction on how to
comply); Mary W. Gray, The Concept of Substantial Proportionality in Title IX Athletic
Cases, 3 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 165, 168 (1996) (asserting that schools have
received little guidance from courts on how to reach safe harbor provisions of Title
IX and what constitutes equal treatment of female and male athletes).
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to the mercy of judges' capricious definitions of "substantially
proportionate. '" 15 4
The logic behind the Policy Interpretation is further called
into question when considering the district court's assessment of
the second prong in Cohen III, and the decision's subsequent affir-
mation by the First Circuit in Cohen IV, is considered. Since the
second prong requires Brown to make a showing that it has a his-
tory and a continuing practice of expanding athletic programs for
the underrepresented gender, Brown's extraordinary expansion ef-
forts for women's sports in the 1970s are of absolutely no signifi-
cance to the district court.1 55 Although the district court and the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit lauded Brown's expansion
efforts at earlier stages in this litigation,1 56 the school's failure to
add more women's varsity teams to the already-existing sixteen wo-
men's squads kept it from meeting the second prong. 157 The
154. See Jerry R. Parkinson, Grappling With Gender Equity, 5 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS.J. 75, 98 (1996) (discussing failure by OCR to provide educational institutions
with any tangible intimation on how to meet substantial proportionality
requirement).
There is a certain irony in the Cohen II decision which stated that, during lean
economic times, schools need not pour money into their athletic programs. Cohen
II, 991 F.2d at 898 n.15. Instead, to comply with Tide IX, a school may slash the
number of opportunities it provides for the overrepresented gender while keeping
the amount of opportunities for the underrepresented gender stagnant. See id.
Therefore, although cutting men's sports does nothing to increase the amount of
opportunities for women, eliminating men's sports is recognized as a means that is
not only accepted but encouraged by the courts as a means to achieve proportional-
ity. See Parkinson at 112-13. This approach directly contradicts the decree of Tide
IX that prohibits decisions from being made "on basis of sex." 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a)
(1988).
155. See William E. Thro & Brian A. Snow, Cohen v. Brown University and the
Future of Intercollegiate Athletics, 84 EDuC. L. REP. 611, 624 (1993) (suggesting that,
under second prong, history of athletic expansion for underrepresented gender in
1970s or 1980s is ultimately irrelevant without simultaneously demonstrating per-
petual practice of expansion).
156. See Cohen III, 879 F. Supp. at 211 ("Brown University has an impressive
history of program expansion ... ."); Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 903 (conceding that
Brown had "supercharged" fledgling women's athletic program).
157. See Cohen III, 879 F. Supp. at 211 (noting that percentage of women par-
ticipating in athletics at Brown has remained steady, which is unacceptable under
second prong); see alsoJohnson, supra note 3, at 582 (stating second prong is stum-
bling block due to continuing practice requirement); Thro, supra note 155, at 624
(noting that most schools would fail second prong because they have not added
any sports recently, even if sports were added in the 1970s and 1980s).
In his dissent in the instant case, Chief Judge Torruella noted that the Cohen
III decision inexorably required that a school facing economic constraints, in or-
der to comply with prong two, must increase the number of athletic opportunities
for the underrepresented gender, even if the school cannot afford to do so. See
Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 193 (Torruella, C.J., dissenting). Torruella further suggested
that this demand goes well beyond the scope of Title IX. "A school is not required
to sponsor an athletic program of any particular size. It is not for the courts, or the
[Vol. 5: p. 295
26
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol5/iss2/4
COHEN V. BROWN
emerging conjecture is that program expansion, like substantial
proportionality, seems a poor substitute and perhaps a poorer mea-
surement for legitimate accommodation of students' athletic inter-
ests and abilities.158
Similar to the first two components of the test, the third prong,
full and effective accommodation of the underrepresented gen-
der's athletic interests and abilities, was not necessarily interpreted
or applied correctly during earlier stages of the litigation for vari-
ous reasons. 159 First, since there were several ostensible interpreta-
tions of prong three, the Cohen fV court owed no deference to the
interpretation chosen by the lower court, because it was not a
choice made by an agency. 160 Second, the definition chosen by the
district court turns the entire three-part test into an affirmative ac-
tion, quota-based scheme. 161
The district court rejected Brown's argument that the school
fully and effectively accommodated the athletic interests of its stu-
dent body by providing participation opportunities in proportion
to the interest of each sex.162 In fact, the Cohen H court concluded
that unless Brown can show absolute numerical parity, the school
would not be fully and effectively accommodating the interest of its
female students.' 63 The Cohen H court also declared that evaluating
a school under prong three "requires a relatively simple assessment
of whether there is unmet need in the underrepresented gen-
legislature, for that matter, to mandate programs of a given size. The most that
can be demanded is that athletics be provided in a non-discriminatory matter." Id.
(Torruella, C.J., dissenting).
158. See Parkinson, supra note 155, at 120.
159. See generally Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 193-95 (Torruella, C.J., dissenting) (ex-
plaining that district court's narrow, isolated interpretation of Title IX in Cohen III
essentially creates quota-based scheme for compliance).
160. See Cohen T, 101 F.3d at 195 (Torruella, C.J., dissenting). As previously
discussed, the Cohen IV majority unnecessarily bound itself to the "law of the case
doctrine." See id. (Torruella, C.J., dissenting). Instead, because there were multi-
ple possible interpretations, the Cohen IV court should have reviewed the district
court's reading de novo. See id. (Torruella, C.J., dissenting).
161. See id. (Torruella, C.J., dissenting); Davidson & Kerr, supra note 152, at
45-46 ("Adding varsity positions for women until the percentage of women varsity
athletes equals the percentage of women students is a form of affirmative action.").
The dissent in Cohen IV stressed that the outcome of the test, not the number of
steps involved, illustrates that a quota system exists. See Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 196
(Torruella, C.J., dissenting). "[T]he school can escape the quota under prong
three only by offering preferential treatment to the group that has demonstrated
less interest in athletics." Id. (Torruella, C.J., dissenting).
162. See Cohen 111, 991 F. Supp. at 208. Because this argument was built on the
same foundation as Brown's argument on substantial proportionality, it was re-
jected by the court. See id. at 210.
163. See Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 898.
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der."1 64 However, at no time throughout the litigation did the
court explain how this "relatively simple" assessment could be
taken. 165 Astoundingly, the court made no effort to follow its own
suggestion as, on remand, the Cohen III court refused to accept any
empirical evidence from Brown demonstrating that the school was
accommodating the underrepresented gender's interests.166 The
district court claimed, "[i]t is unclear what population should be
surveyed to assess the interest of the 'qualified applicant pool,' even
if it were possible to do so."167 If prong three is to have any sub-
stance, some method must be available to assess student interests
and abilities. 168
The practical result of not allowing a school to use survey data
is to eviscerate prong three and leave the first prong, substantial
proportionality, as the only test for compliance with Title IX.169
164. Id. at 900.
165. See Parkinson, supra note 154, at 127.
166. See Jill Mulderink, Par for the Course: Cohen v. Brown University Mandates
an Equal Playing Field in Intercollegiate Athletics, 22J.C. & U.L. 111, 128 (1995) (ex-
pressing that district court should have prescribed some test, survey or method to
guide schools in their assessment of student's athletic interests and needs). See also
Cohen IV, 101 F.3d at 197 (Torruella, CJ., dissenting) (noting that majority approv-
ingly cited to statistical evaluations when considering women's participation in ath-
letics in proportion to their enrollment, yet, when interest level of women at
Brown is at issue, court adopts much more critical attitude towards statistical
evidence).
167. Cohen III, 879 F. Supp. at 206.
168. See Parkinson, supra note 154, at 127; Mulderink, supra note 166, at 127
(questioning how institution can measure number of unaccommodated female
athletes without asking females whether they are interested in participating in in-
stitution's athletic programs); Whitehead, supra note 140, at 39 (stressing that
surveys or studies of interest in and ability to compete in college sports is more
"intellectually honest" measure of Title IX compliance than unsubstantiated reli-
ance on numbers); Davidson & Kerr, supra note 152, at 30 ("Without having a basis
in students' interests and abilities, these additions [of women's sports] and subtrac-
tions [of men's sports] are not only arbitrary, but are in themselves discriminatory
and contrary to the intent of Title IX.").
Commentators have suggested that the concept of "statistical significance,"
used in the resolution of Title VII cases, be employed in Tide IX cases as it would
provide courts and schools with an appropriate instrument to measure "substantial
proportionality." See Gray, supra note 153, at 185.
169. See Straubel, supra note 152, at 1054; Beveridge, supra note 152, at 822
(emphasizing that substantial proportionality is essentially only way to comply with
Title IX since second and third prongs are inapplicable); see also Whitehead, supra
note 140, at 140 ("There has been sort of an unquestioned acceptance that only
the first part of the test is relevant."); Shook, supra note 16, at 806 (admitting that
substantial proportionality prong is only viable option for schools to use to meet
Title IX obligations); Mahoney, supra note 65, at 969-70 (demonstrating that,
although test provides school three means by which to comply with Title IX, most
schools may only comply with Title IX by meeting substantial proportionality
prong); Parkinson, supra note 154, at 137 (noting that Cohen courts' full accommo-
dation theory, applied as court contemplated, leads to proportionality evaluation
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Ironically, the Cohen courts' application of the full accommodation
theory inevitably coerces schools to comply with proportionality -
and the easiest way to achieve proportionality is to cut athletic pro-
grams, an approach which is the antithesis of "full
accommodation." 170
Finally, there is the argument that the Policy Interpretation
should not enjoy controlling weight as a regulation because it is
contrary to the statute that established Title IX.171 The statute says
that the rules, regulations and orders authorized under 20 U.S.C.
§ 1682 do not become effective "unless and until approved by the
President."172 In this case, since the Policy Interpretation was
neither submitted to nor approved by the President, the Policy In-
terpretation arguably does not have the force of law and should not
have been accorded the deference given it by the Cohen III court. 73
VI. IMPACT
Due to the court's inflexible application of the poorly crafted
three-prong test throughout this litigation, Brown is left with two
lamentable options: cut the number of men's teams or eliminate its
athletic programs entirely.174 This lesser of two evils dilemma ulti-
mately derives from the OCR's test which, to be meaningful, must
drop the disjunctive "or" from its standard so that all three prongs
are considered together when reviewing whether a university has
and renders prong three virtually useless);Jennifer L. Henderson, Gender Equity in
Intercollegiate Athletics: A Commitment to Fairness, 5 SETON HALLJ. SPORT L. 133, 142
(1995) (designating substantial proportionality and continuing program expan-
sion prongs as "unlikely... to achieve" and "unreasonable."); George, supra note
153, at 654 (indicating that substantial proportionality has become only prong of
three-part test which schools can realistically meet).
170. See Parkinson, supra note 154, at 132 (highlighting Cohen courts' use of
three-prong test that seemingly contravenes purpose of Title IX).
171. See Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 910 n.45 (M.D. La.
1996). For discussion of the weight accorded agency regulations, see supra note 56
and accompanying text.
172. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1994).
173. See Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 910 n.45.
174. See Deidre G. Duncan, Gender Equity in Women's Athletics, 64 U. CIN. L.
REv. 1027, 1050-51 (explaining that Cohen decision exemplifies ridiculousness of
strict application of proportionality requirement and that men's sports programs
will inevitably suffer if such analysis is applied in subsequent cases); see alsoJohn
Gibeaut, Shooting for Reality on the Playing Fields, A.B.A. J., May 1997, at 41 (stating
that UCLA cut men's swimming squad, even though that program has produced
twenty-two Olympic medalists); Shook, supra note 16, at 814 (noting that schools
seeking compliance with Title IX must eliminate more men's sports in order to
support participation ratios that will be acceptable to federal courts).
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complied with Title IX.175 Considering the three-part test as a
whole stands to be a more effective and comprehensive method for
courts and schools to judge Title IX compliance. 176 Currently, uni-
versities cannot be expected to match exactly the percentage of fe-
male athletes with the percentage of females in the student body
from year to year. 177
The ultimate effect of courtroom battles concerning Title IX,
like the result in Cohen, is that men's teams will simply end up being
hurt rather than women's teams being helped. 178 Forcing schools
to eliminate men's sports may discriminate against male athletes if
the differing interests and abilities of male and female students to
compete in intercollegiate athletics are not considered.1 79 Rather
than cutting men's programs in order to avoid expanding women's
175. See Parkinson, supra note 154, at 148-49; see also Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at
914 (claiming that prongs should not be taken separately). If each prong is taken
individually, the simplicity of the substantial proportionality prong becomes an
easy way out for both courts and institutions; in the meantime, the other two
prongs are ignored. See id. at 109.
176. See Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 914 (holding that proper reading of Policy
Interpretation and proper analysis under effective accommodation allows for con-
sideration of all factors listed therein to determine whether school had provided
equal opportunity for males and females); see also Davidson & Kerr, supra note 152,
at 35 (revealing ludicrousness of how universities may meet one of test's prongs
but still be in gross violation of Title IX).
177. See Gray, supra note 153, at 188; see also Straubel, supra note 153, at 1069
(noting confusion and injustice created by having target number for substantial
proportionality which fluctuates yearly); Whitehead, supra note 140, at 40
(stressing that strict proportionality approach, though attractive on its face, is
counterproductive to athletes who have ability to compete at college level, and is
contrary to meaning of Title IX).
178. See Straubel, supra note 152, at 1040; see also Ted Curtis, Wrestling With
Title IX Compliance and Men's Sports Programs, 13 ENT. & SPORTS L. 1, 14-15 (1995)
(reporting that numerous men's wrestling, swimming, gymnastics and tennis teams
are being eliminated from college athletic departments across country in order to
comply with Title IX); Evans, supra note 36, at 60 (noting that 366 NCAA schools
have established women's soccer teams since 1982 while 99 schools have discontin-
ued men's wrestling programs, 64 schools have eliminated men's swimming teams,
and NCAA men's gymnastics programs have been reduced from 133 teams in 1975
to only 30 teams in 1996); David H. Moon, Gender [In]Equity? An Analysis of Title IX
Lawsuits in Intercollegiate Athletics, 6 DEPAuL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 87, 101 (sug-
gesting that many male athletes will lose opportunity to participate in college ath-
letics as result of Title IX); Diane Heckman, The Explosion of Title IX Legal Activity in
Intercollegiate Athletics During 1992-93: Defining the Equal Opportunity Standard, 1994
DET. C.L. REV. 953, 995-96 (1994) (highlighting language from Kelley decision
which pointed out "inherent unfairness" of such decisions which classify and iso-
late one gender to carry burdens which other gender is not required to bear);
Gibeaut, supra note 174, at 41 (realizing that schools are taking easiest path to
compliance by cutting men's programs rather than adding women's programs);
George, supra note 152, at 652 (discussing schools' decisions to eliminate men's
sports in order to increase percentage of female athletes and suggesting that in-
creased attention on women's sports comes at expense of male athletes).
179. See Beveridge, supra note 152, at 842.
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programs, a more workable Title IX approach is to guarantee that
each gender will be able to participate in intercollegiate athletics at
a rate proportional to its ability and interest. 180 Meanwhile, the
push for proportionality should be made at primary and secondary
schools, where encouragement and opportunities to participate in
sports must be provided to both girls and boys. 181
Despite an appeal from Brown University, the Supreme Court
refused to grant certiorari and review this case. 182 As an implicit
endorsement of the First Circuit's findings, the Supreme Court is
running the clock out against collegiate athletic departments across
the country. Instead of reading Title IX as legislation that ensures
opportunities for female athletes, the courts have mutated Title IX
into a statute that encourages schools to stop making advances for
women in sports, so long as the schools eliminate opportunities for
men.
183
In Cohen III, the district court made the preposterous sugges-
tion that Brown University seek compliance with Title IX by
180. See id.; see also Mahoney, supra note 65, at 976 (suggesting that it is not
discriminatory for schools to respond to interests and abilities of more men than
women when there is greater number of interested and able male student-ath-
letes); Straubel, supra note 152, at 1042 (declaring that Title IX implementation
efforts must take into account different levels of interest in intercollegiate athletics
between women and men); Davidson & Kerr, supra note 152, at 45 (proposing
that, in implementing Tide IX, relevant pools of individuals to consider should be
those student-athletes subject to discrimination, female and male student-athletes
who possess interest in and ability to participate in college athletics; and stressing,
"[p]roviding opportunities in proportion to the number of athletes of each sex
with interest and ability avoids sex discrimination; providing opportunities in pro-
portion to overall enrollment creates discrimination").
181. See id.; Straubel, supra note 152, at 1074 (urging that youngsters be given
equal opportunity to participate in sports and suggesting that proportionality can-
not be required of colleges until proportionality is found in high schools); David-
son & Kerr, supra note 152, at 29 (noting difficulty for men and women who lack
high school varsity experience to develop interest in and ability to play sports in
college and suggesting that, without changes in participation rates in secondary
school, ratio of men to women with requisite interest and ability to participate at
collegiate level will not change); Brian A. Snow & William E. Thro, Still on the
Sidelines: Developing the Non-discrimination Paradigm Until Title IX, 3 DuKE J. GENDER
L. & POL'Y 1, 45 (theorizing that, if development of athletic skills at elementary,
middle and high school levels is emphasized, there will be interest when these
students reach the college level).
182. Cohen TV, 101 F.3d 155, cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3711 (U.S. Apr. 21, 1997)
(No. 96-1321).
183. See Parkinson, supra note 154, at 125 ("One reasonably could question
whether cutting men's opportunities, or paring both men's and women's opportu-
nities, purely for the sake of symmetry does anything to 'effectively accommodate'
student interests and abilities."); see also Spitz, supra note 2, at 656 (highlighting
paradoxical result of Tide IX's implementation); Forseth, supra note 3, at 95 (re-
marking that abolishing entire varsity athletic program in order to comply with
Title IX harms all athletes, male and female).
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"eliminat[ing] its athletic program altogether."184 It seems unlikely
that the drafters of Title IX, a statute encouraging athletic opportu-
nities, ever intended for it to become a statute that promoted the
elimination of intercollegiate athletics.
18 5
Ted Riley Cheesebrough
184. Cohen 111, 879 F. Supp. at 214.
185. See Christopher Raymond, Title IX Litigation in the 1990's: The Courts Need
a Game Plan, 18 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 665, 684; see also Spitz, supra note 2, at 655
("The primary purpose of Title IX was to provide equality for women in intercolle-
giate athletics .... Compliance with Title IX has essentially signaled the death
knell for many athletic programs.").
If courts refuse to consider the practical results of their decisions, the long-
term ramifications could be staggering. See Raymond at 655. If subsequent Title
IX cases are decided in accord with Cohen, the future of intercollegiate athletics
could be imperiled by the very statute which was intended to proliferate them. See
id.
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